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An increasing number of feminists agree with Susan Moller Okin’s claim that multiculturalism is ‘bad 
for women’ (Okin 1998; 1999), because it locks them up within the confines of their traditional, often 
patriarchal communities and hands them over to the power of the men within that community. Okin was 
the first in a long line of Western authors who questioned the feminist credentials of multiculturalism.2 
One of them is a former Dutch politician, Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Her fierce denunciations of Islam and of 
relativistic multiculturalism, as well as her praise of the blessings of Western liberalism made her into 
one of the most admired and despised public figures in the Netherlands.3 In 2004, she made a short film, 
Submission Part I, which vehemently denounced the oppression of Muslim women as purportedly 
legitimized by the Koran. When shortly afterwards its director Theo van Gogh was murdered by an 
Islamic fundamentalist, Hirsi Ali was caught in the spotlights of the international media. In the summer 
of 2006, she left the Netherlands in order to take up a position at the American Enterprise Institute, a 
conservative Washington think-tank. The recent publication of her autobiography Infidel and the 
announcement of her next book, Shortcut to Enlightenment, indicate that she is determined to continue 
her ‘jihad’ (see Hirsi Ali and Wilders 2003) against the mysogynous views of a fundamentalist Islam that 
wishes to curb all expressions of autonomous female sexuality.4 She is convinced that women are much 
better off with Western liberal views on gender relationships and sexuality, because they are based on the 
values of equality and individual autonomy. By doing so, Hirsi Ali has firmly inscribed herself in the 
tradition of liberal feminism.  
 Some decades ago, feminists fought a different ideological battle over female sexuality. The 
battleground then was located in the domains of pornography and prostitution. Liberal feminists took 
issue with the radical feminist standpoint which denounced pornography and prostitution as forms of 
sexual slavery that were degrading for women. The liberals argued that feminists, rather than supporting 
the conservative and puritan rejection of such practices, should conceive them as legitimate forms of 
work on condition that women engaged in them voluntarily. To present pornstars and prostitutes as 
victims only reaffirmed the traditional opposition between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ women, as well as the so-
called madonna-whore complex which had a detrimental effect on the sexual liberty of all women. 
Prostitutes therefore deserved to be recognized as strong women who by capitalizing their bodies proved 
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their sexual autononomy.5 In the Netherlands, this liberal feminist standpoint gained significant 
influence. Policymakers and politicians became convinced that the legalization of prostitution would 
both improve the position of voluntary ‘sex workers’ and enable the authorities to better combat forced 
and illegal prostitution. As a consequence, since 2000, the ban on the prohibition of brothels in the 
Netherlands has been lifted, and prostitution has become an officially recognized profession.  
 
The question is: to what extent are women indeed better off with a liberal view of gender relationships 
and female sexual autonomy? Should public policies indeed be guided by the unconditional respect for 
the autonomy of (adult) citizens, or might it be wiser concerning some practices to consider a more 
paternalistic approach? These questions will be addressed by a comparison between two recent debates, 
i.e. the debate on the position of Muslim women, and the debate on the legal and moral status of 
prostitution. The focus will be on the Netherlands, but the issues are of current interest in all Western 
societies. The position of Muslim women and of prostitutes are usually considered to refer to entirely 
different issues: the first addresses the complicated relationship between feminism and multiculturalism, 
the second touches upon the sensitive issue of the relationship between feminism and conceptions of 
sexuality – where in both cases feminism is understood as intrinsic part of the Western legacy of 
liberalism. However, divergent topics such as (female) virginity, forced or arranged marriage, female 
genital mutilation, the headscarf, double sexual standards, the madonna-whore complex and the recent 
complaints about the pornographisation of popular culture all seem to revolve around the same issue, that 
of female sexual autonomy. In order to answer the central question, the paper will start with some 
conceptual clarification by drawing a distinction between moral, ethical and personal autonomy and the 
ensuing interpretations of liberalism as a political philosophy (1), and discuss shortly the contested 
relation between the ideals of autonomy and equality within feminist theory (2). The second part of the 
paper focuses on the interpretation of autonomy and liberalism as defended by Ayaan Hirsi Ali in her 
plea for the liberation of Muslim women. Her radical view of liberalism as the only reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine, and of personal autonomy as the only road to human flourishing, is criticized 
for its illiberal implications (2). Nevertheless, regarding some practices, i.e. those that one has good 
reasons  to suspect that they are harmful to the women involved, Hirsi Ali’s attitude of sympathetic 
distrust deserves to be taken seriously (3). In the third part of the paper, this perspective will be used to 
assess anew the old controversy between liberal and radical feminists over prostitution(4). It will be 
concluded that, if we accept that what counts as an autonomous choice is not always and entirely up to 
the judgement of the subject of choice, (sexual) autonomy cannot be a sufficient criterion for deciding 
about the best public approach to the position of women within either Islam or the sex industry. In order 
to develop a consistent and tenable political position, liberals need to break with the doctrine of the 
priority of the right over the good, and initiate public discussions about what count as reasonable (and 
unreasonable) conceptions of the good of sexuality (5). 
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1. Liberalism and autonomy 
The political philosophy of liberalism starts from two basic values: the harm principle and the principle 
of autonomy. John Stuart Mill aptly captured both in a single formula: ‘The only freedom which 
deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not deprive others 
of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it’ (Mill 1972: 75). In contemporary political and moral 
philosophy, autonomy is an essentially contested and multi-layered concept. All definitions or 
classifications of forms or levels of autonomy are based on and have repercussions for a particular 
interpretation of liberalism as a political theory. In its most literal sense, autonomy means self (auto) rule 
(nomos), or self-government. According to Gerald Dworkin, by exercising autonomy, ‘persons define 
their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they 
are’ (Dworkin 1988: 20). In this paper I distinguish three forms of autonomy.  
 
1.1 Moral autonomy  
The first form of autonomy is moral autonomy: the capacity to set oneself and obey universal laws. It is 
the will and the capacity to obey principles that one acknowledges as binding for all, that one consents to 
as self-imposed obligations. Following one of the formulations of the categorical Imperative, this 
Kantian interpretation of autonomy requires that one acknowledges the dignity of each human being as 
an end in itself. A person is morally autonomous in this sense ‘when he is not guided just by his own 
conception of happiness, but by a unversalized concern for the ends of all rational persons’ (Waldron 
2005: 307). This interpretation of moral autonomy overlaps to a considerable extent with what Rawls, in 
his exposition of political liberalism, has termed ‘political’ or ‘full autonomy’ (Rawls 1993: 77-78). 
Persons are fully autonomous when they perceive themselves and others as free and equal citizens of a 
well-ordered society. This is understood as a public conception of identity, which remains unaffected by 
any (change in the) personal, nonpolitical commitment or aim of citizens (1993: 30). Moral autonomy is 
intrinsically linked with Rawls’s principle of the priority of the right over the good. It presupposes a 
sense of justice, and addresses the practical question: how should one act in relation to others? Putting 
moral or political autonomy first produces a ‘thin’ version of liberalism, according to which a liberal 
society is radically tolerant vis-à-vis the comprehensive doctrines citizens adhere to as persons. Even if 
these are doctrines that require individuals to submit to a higher (say, religious) authority, they are 
considered ‘reasonable’ and hence permissible so long as they are coherent with the principles of justice 
as fairness. Political liberalism prescribes that the state should remain neutral in this respect. However, 
Rawls admits that state neutrality regarding personal aims does not amount to neutrality of effect: 
political liberalism will inevitably be less hospitable to some life forms, however reasonable, than to 
others. But this is not a matter of injustice, it is rather a tragic fact of human life. Referring to Berlin, 
Rawls reminds us that ‘there is no social world without loss’ (1993: 197).  
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 Will Kymlicka disagrees. The privileging of certain life forms over others is not merely a 
contingent, empirical effect of political liberalism, it is a conceptual implication of it. By embracing 
moral (i.e. political) autonomy, including civil rights such as freedom of opinion, speech and religion, the 
liberal state makes it clear that, as citizens, individuals are free to critically explore different views and 
commitments, including their own, and that they may change them if they wish to do so. Through state 
institutions and regulations, such as free public education for both sexes, subsidy for day care centers or 
the legalization of gay marriage, this message will inevitably ‘spill over’ and affect the way citizens 
relate to themselves as private persons. Rawls’s neat distinction between the public role of citizens and 
their private life as persons is considered implausible (Kymlicka 2002: 233-239).  
 
1.2 Ethical autonomy 
Despite Rawls’s claim that moral autonomy is ‘political not ethical’ (1993: 77), it paves the way for the 
liberal appreciation of a second form of autonomy, i.e. ethical autonomy. According to Rawls, politically 
autonomous citizens regard themselves and their fellow citizens as free persons, who have the power and 
the right ‘to form, revise and rationally pursue a conception of the good’ (Rawls 1993: 30).6 This 
capacity of ethical autonomy is conditional upon a sense of the good life, and addresses the practical 
question: what kind of life is worth living, what kind of person do I aspire to be? Early liberals such as 
Kant and Mill already emphasized the right of individuals to pursue their own happiness. The emphasis 
was as much on pursuing one’s own good (vs. universal principles) as on the good (vs. the right). Ethical 
autonomy is similar to what Isaiah Berlin called positive liberty, as mastery of one’s own life, ‘to be 
moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own’ (Berlin 1969: 13). Although Kant still 
suggested that the aims of morality (doing your duty) and happiness (pursuing your desire) are mutually 
exclusive, moral and ethical autonomy are in fact closely linked, since they are both subject to the 
principle of self-government. The subject listens to his own reason (or conscience) in setting and obeying 
the universal law, and listens to his own heart (his desires and emotions) when he pursues his happiness 
in the way he sees fit (see Waldron 2005).      
 Still, ethical autonomy is bound to moral limits. As already indicated, Rawls’s political 
liberalism is based on an overlapping consensus between ‘reasonable’ comprehensive doctrines. The 
choice to become a committed member of the maffia for instance, however authentic and well-
considered, does not qualify as a reasonable option. In the words of Joseph Raz, autonomy counts as a 
value insofar as it involves a choice among goods: ‘a choice between good and evil is not enough’ (Raz 
1986: 378). Ethical autonomy is therefore constrained by the Millian harm principle, according to which 
individuals are free to do whatever they wish as long as they do not harm others. But within these 
boundaries, someone who is ethically autonomous is free to choose her own path in life.  
 While moral autonomy is a capacity which human beings possess even in the most oppressive 
circumstances, individuals must dispose of sufficient opportunities in order to exercise ethical autonomy. 
Society must offer them sufficient meaningful options to choose from. Hence the extent to which 
 4
individuals in their personal life can truly exercise ethical autonomy also depends on the amount of civic, 
political and social rights and liberties they enjoy as citizens.7  
 
Liberalism values toleration and plurality. Neutrality of the state vis-à-vis comprehensive doctrines 
seems the best strategy to generate a plural society. But - I already referred to Kymlicka’s doubts - to 
which extent is such neutrality really possible? Does the value of ethical autonomy not discourage 
certain conceptions of the good life and support others? Does it not for instance privilege forms of life in 
which individual life plans take precedence over the goals of a collectivity? Does it not allow more room 
for citizens who are prepared to put their dearest-held convictions up for discussion than for citizens who 
do not consider their final ends in any way revisable? And does it not favour the calculating and rational 
personality type, while disregarding those with a more impetuous temperament? Several scholars take 
Kymlicka’s line of argument to the bolder conclusion that ethical autonomy constitutes the 
comprehensive or perfectionist core of liberalism. Because liberal-democratic societies have a high 
regard for autonomy, Joseph Raz thinks that individuals in such societies are only able to flourish by 
becoming more autonomous (Raz 1986: 394). Moreover, logically speaking, the harm principle does not 
determine the extent to which the state is justified to curb the autonomy of its citizens. Rather the other 
way around: what counts as harmful is decided by the extent to which a person’s autonomy is violated 
(400). Therefore the state has more than a mere negative duty to prevent violations of autonomy. It also 
has the positive duty to encourage and support the autonomy of citizens as ‘an essential ingredient of the 
good life’ (415).  
  
The notion of ethical autonomy, however, confronts us with a conundrum. For, what criteria decide 
when a person is truly exercising ethical autonomy? Ethical autonomy requires that a person is not only 
independent of undesirable external influences, but also that she is able to withstand internal impulses 
that keep her from achieving the aims she has set for herself. Ethical autonomy is closely linked with the 
romantic notion of authenticity, while lacking the connotation of emotional immediacy. A truly 
autonomous person is someone who is able to rationally reflect upon her first-order desires and hence 
able to agree with and act according to what her second-order desires, her ‘better self’, tells her to do. 
The obvious problem with this distinction is that it projects a false illusion of objectivity. For what 
criteria decide whether one’s conception of one’s better self is ‘really’ better? From which perspective 
can we judge this? For example: when I am offered a delicious bonbon, my first impulse is to accept it, 
while my better self tells  me to refuse it, because I do not want to become overweight. But is this 
second-order warning not caused by an undesirable (third-order) identification with the ideal of female 
beauty canvassed by the Western fashion industry? Because of this problem of infinite regress, and 
because they cherish the political ideal of value pluralism, most liberals insist that ethical autonomy must 
be seen as a procedural capacity. Its value remains independent of the actual aims a person has set herself 
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in life. If push comes to shove, ethical autonomy is first and foremost about living your life ‘from the 
inside’ (Kymlicka 2002: 222). 
 But this is a risky strategy. It leaves little room for social or political criticism of the ways in 
which individuals choose to live their lives. Whether their lifestyle forms a valuable contribution to 
society or not, and whether it advances or frustrates their own good, is left to the subject herself to 
decide. Even the godfather of modern liberalism, John Stuart Mill, hesitates on this account. As Anthony 
Kwame Appiah demonstrates, Mill valued ethical autonomy (‘self-cultivation’ or ‘individuality’) as a 
means to achieve a particular higher end. He believed that society should cherish individualistic, 
nonconformist lifestyles and give room to men of genius, because this would be the key to scientific, 
artistic and cultural progress. But on the other hand, he considered ethical autonomy as a good in itself: it 
mattered more that a person would lead her own life rather than a life that stood out as unique or better 
(Appiah 2005: 5). Appiah prefers to elaborate the latter idea, which leads to the paradoxical outcome that 
a person may have an autonomous aspiration to live a life in servitude. Appiah illustrates this by 
referring to Mr. Stevens, the protagonist of Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel The Remains of the Day (1989). 
Everything in Mr. Stevens’s life is geared to fulfilling his heartfelt desire to become a perfect butler. A 
perfect butler puts himself entirely at the service of his master. Mr. Stevens therefore does his utmost to 
discipline himself to such an extent as to completely discard his own thoughts, emotions and wishes. 
Appiah makes a convincing case that a life guided by an ethic of service mays not only be fully 
autonomous, but can also be a life of dignity (Appiah 2005: 11). Gerald Dworkin likewise emphasizes 
that ‘a person who wishes to be restricted in various ways, whether by the disciplne of the monastery, 
regimentation of the army, or even by coercion, is not, on that account alone, less autonomous’ (Dworkin 
1988: 18). Appiah and Dworkin thus defend a comprehensive brand of liberalism that is nevertheless 
open to illiberal conceptions of the good which espouse such ‘out-dated’ social roles as that of a butler or 
a nun.  
 
1.3 Personal autonomy 
The third and final form of autonomy I would like to distinguish is personal autonomy. Personal 
autonomy is the substantive counterpart of the procedural value of ethical autonomy and the core value 
of a comprehensive doctrine which I will call radical liberalism. According to this particular 
conception of the good, ‘the aim is to make a life in which you yourself matter most’ (Appiah 2005: 
15). In radical liberalism, self-cultivation and self-creation are not seen only as the goals of some 
eccentric geniuses, as Mill did, but as an ideal life-fulfillment for all human beings. This conception of 
the good propagates an individualistic lifestyle in which everything is geared to realizing one’s own 
talents and dreams. Individuals are assumed to be primarily motivated by the urge to distinguish 
themselves. The end of such a life is to stand out, to ‘make a career’. The relationship with others is a 
competitive rather than a caring relationship. The only kind of legitimate association are voluntary 
associations which are established to serve the interests or needs of individuals who may resign their 
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membership whenever they wish. Less voluntary communities which are constituted through the 
bonds of family, nation or culture are contemplated with distrust. The appeal to loyalty to one’s 
community should not interfere with a person’s individual life plan. Perhaps this ‘rather unattractive 
form of individualism’ (which Appiah is certain Mill did not have in mind) is not explicitly defended 
by any political philosopher. But we seem to approach the hidden perfectionist core of the political 
doctrine of libertarianism as defended by Robert Nozick, whose conception of self-ownership amounts 
to an interpretation of individual autonomy in this thick sense.  
 As Richard Sennett convincingly shows, in our meritocratic, media-governed and late-
capitalist society, personal autonomy is swiftly turning into the most privileged form of life. Respect is 
no longer something to which individuals are entitled on the grounds of their human capacity for 
(moral and ethical) autonomy alone. Nowadays, respect has to be earned: by developing one’s abilities 
and skills, by being self-sufficient, and by giving back to others. Dependency on others is condemned 
as waste and parasitism. Individuals who do not manage to live up to this radical ideal (because they 
are unwilling or incapable), do not count for much. This is the reason why people at the bottom of 
society experience a fundamental discomfort. They suffer from a lack of respect, which may 
resentment and anger, ‘a desire to avenge’ (Sennett 2003).  
 In modern Western societies, radical liberalism is increasingly perceived as the only 
reasonable philosophy of the good life. Individuals are expected to conform to one dominant idea of 
what makes a human life a good and a successful life.  
 
2. Autonomy and gender equality: feminist perspectives   
Feminism has always been a complicated project in which the values of gender equality and female 
autonomy sometimes clashed (Saharso 2000: 38). Ever since Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the 
Rights of Women (1792) feminists have challenged the sexist conviction of Kant and other 
philosophers that women lacked moral autonomy. They demanded recognition of women as free 
agents and equal citizens to men. When demanding equal rights for women, however, 20th century 
feminists realized that one cannot ignore the roles and identities historically ascribed to and adopted 
by women. The dominant societal order is not gender-neutral, but structurally favours (white, middle-
class, etc.) male subjects. Hence, while some feminists gave priority to struggles for equality and 
inclusion, others scrutinized the fields in which equality was to be achieved and questioned whether 
this was the kind of equality women should aspire to. For example, rather than demanding the right for 
women to become soldiers, pacifist feminists argued for the abolition of the military. Instead of asking 
men to engage in prostitution in order to satisfy the sexual appetites of women, radical feminists 
demanded that prostitution be banned. And rather than pursue a career and make serious money, 
socialist feminists advocated a more just redistribution of material and immaterial goods for all. 
Consequently, feminist struggles for gender equality have always been accompanied by struggles for 
the recognition of female-feminine difference. Such projects demanded space for women to speak for 
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themselves, to find and articulate their ‘own’ voice. To phrase it in the terms used in the previous 
section: women demanded the same liberty as men to form and pursue their own conception of the 
good life, i.e. recognition of their ethical autonomy.  
 Similar to the struggles for the moral and ethical autonomy of women, those for equality and 
difference are not opposite but interdependent strategies. Political equality rests upon the recognition 
of differences, which in turn implies the recognition of the equal value of these differences. As Joan 
Scott observed, ‘[t]he history of feminism is the history of women who have only paradoxes to offer’ 
(Scott 1996: 5). 8 Still, the aims of equality and difference do not go together well. Many liberal 
feminists assume that if women are really free to choose for themselves, they will (should) prefer the 
same kind of individualistic life trajectory as (Western, middle-class, white) men aspire to. But, as the 
above examples suggest, thist is not always the case. More critical or radical feminists envision that a 
difference-oriented approach will transform existing society, particularly the traditional gender roles of 
men and women.9 Alas, empirical data suggest that many women neither wish to become the socio-
economic equals of men nor seek a feminist transformation of existing relationships. A considerable 
number of Dutch women, for instance, some of whom identify themselves as feminist, prefer to stay at 
home in order to care for their children rather than pursue a career. Others claim that they have freely 
chosen to make their money in the porn-business or in prostitution. The routine response from the side 
of strict equality thinkers as well as firm believers in sexual difference is that these women are not 
really acting on their own free will. They cannot exercise their ethical autonomy because society does 
not yet offer them sufficient opportunities. When pursuing a career, for instance, women in the 
Netherlands do not only face a still dominant ideology of full-time motherhood and male partners who 
are reluctant to do their share of the household, but also receive very little governmental support in the 
form of rights to parental leave and access to affordable day care. Or it is argued that women who 
(supposedly voluntarily) collaborate in the making of adult movies, or who sell their bodies to offer 
sexual services, actually have internalized the oppressive and degrading images of women on which 
these practices thrive.  
 The problem for radical feminists is that, while the juridical and discursive conditions for 
women to take control of their own lives have improved, it has become more difficult to ward off 
reproaches of unjustified paternalism - the more so if these are voiced by the objects of concern 
themselves. This problem is particularly salient in discussions about multiculturalism and prostitution, 
which become most vehement when the sexual autonomy of women is at stake.  
 
3. Ayaan Hirsi Ali and the sexual autonomy of Muslim women 
As in all Western countries, in the aftermath of September 11 the Netherlands were caught up in 
intense debates on cultural diversity, the role of Islam and the limits of toleration. Then a young 
woman caught the eye of the media. Her first public appearance was recalled in a national newspaper 
as follows:  
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 It was a lively debate, where quite different perspectives were put to the fore. But when a 
philosopher took the stage to relativize away the principles of Enlightenment and really went 
too far with her ode to multiculturalism, a woman stood up to put her in her place. She spoke 
Dutch with a mild accent and she was black – in such cases such an audience immediately gets  
quiet as a mouse. This woman denounced the Dutch philosopher, telling her that she had not the 
slightest understanding of Islam […] She asked people not to trivialize the seriousness of the 
current state of Islam, but to criticize it. ‘Islam is in need of an Enlightenment. Don’t abandon 
us. Let us have a Voltaire’ (Vink 2002).  
 
In this way the Dutch media discovered and launched a new talent, the Dutch-Somali Ayaan Hirsi Ali. 
A week later, her first full-page article appeared under the heading ‘Do not abandon us. Let us have a 
Voltaire!’ (Hirsi Ali 2006: 35-41). Hirsi Ali argued that Islam constituted a breeding-ground for 
fundamentalism and terrorism. The Islamic world was a strictly hierarchical world, in which strong 
anti-semitic feelings raged and everything in life was geared to the hereafter. Islamic law, the shari’a, 
enjoyed priority over all human rules and laws. According to Hirsi Ali, this did not just hold for 
fundamentalist Muslims. It was inherent to Islam that a believer was not allowed to doubt or criticize. 
Islam in its current form was therefore incompatible with liberal democracy. The world of Islam 
urgently needed to pass a phase of Enlightenment. Because there was little chance that such a process 
would start in the Islamic world itself, Western countries had a duty to support dissident Muslims.  
Soon after the publication of this widely discussed article, Hirsi Ali came to play the part of 
the female Voltaire of Dutch Islam. She made a name for herself by appearing on national radio and 
television. Disappointed in what she interpreted as the politically correct and overly cautious attitude 
of the social-democratic party (PvdA) 10, during her first period of hiding from death threats by radical 
Muslims, she made a spectacular transition to the conservative liberal party (VVD). In January 2002, 
she was elected a member of the Dutch parliament with 30.000 preferential votes - an impressive 
number for a young, unexperienced woman who had become known to a wider audience only a few 
months earlier.     
 
The philosopher who, according to the newspaper article had gone too far in her celebration of 
multicultural society, was me… Hirsi Ali’s intervention that evening put me off balance, but also 
surprised me: what made her think I had wanted to refuse Islam an Enlightenment? In my lecture, I 
had put myself in the position of a Moroccan Muslim who had migrated to the Netherlands and who, 
in his attempt to master the intricacies of the Dutch language, discovered that the Dutch word heilig 
(‘sacred’ or ‘holy’) meant something like ‘hypocritical’. Apparently, nothing in this culture was 
considered taboo. And people viewed this as a sign of civilization, of something they called 
‘Enlightenment’. The source of that enlightenment appeared to be human Reason, from which a 
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number of principles were inferred, such as the separation between church and state and the freedom 
of opinion. It gradually dawned upon my protagonist that nothing was sacred anymore for these 
enlightened spirits – except the principles of Enlightenment themselves. At the end of my talk, I 
claimed that the crucial question for us should be: ‘how to deal with that which we ourselves hold 
sacred and what is sacred to others?’ (Prins 2001). In other words, far from wishing Muslims to stop to 
think for themselves, I rather interrogated the overly conceited attitude of us, indigenous Dutch.  
 Hirsi Ali, however, objected that given the fact that Muslims suffer from a lack of freedom 
and equality within their own community, my relativization of Western values exemplified an 
inconceivable nonchalance regarding Western achievements, and an even more inconceivable 
indifference regarding the fate of minorities, especially girls and women, within Islam. What I had 
considered self-evident, was not self-evident at all.11  
Since her first public appearance, Hirsi Ali’s views on Islam, liberalism and the rights of 
women have remained remarkably consistent. Like many liberal feminists, she links the feminist 
pursuit for gender equality and the autonomy of women with the achievements of a liberal society, 
while rejecting multicultural recognition of differences as an uncritical acceptance of the ways of life 
of traditional communities, which are detrimental to minorities within those comunities, such as 
children, women, and homosexuals.  
 
3.1 Autonomy as liberation from Islam 
How may one characterize Hirsi Ali’s interpretation of liberalism and autonomy in the light of the 
previous analysis? My first observation is that throughout her discourse, liberalism consistently figures 
as the positive counterpart of Islam: a Muslim believes in the values of community, a liberal in the 
autonomy of the individual; a Muslim tends to be fatalistic, a liberal emphasizes individual 
responsibility; a Muslim obeys to the holy scripture, a liberal follows the constitution. In her 
autobiography, she mentions her gradual discovery that to be moral, people need not be motivated by 
the fear of a revengeful God or the prospect of a heavenly hereafter: ‘My moral compass was within 
myself, not in the pages of a sacred book’ (2007: 281). Referring to the great philosophers of Western 
Enlightenment, she professes her belief in the value of moral autonomy by emphasizing the 
importance of Reason, the obligation to ‘think for ourselves’ and to take responsibility for our own 
morality. While in Islam women are less worthy than men, the Western world acknowledges their 
fundamental equality in all domains of life: political, economic, social and sexual. Human rights are 
also women’s rights. Women consequently deserve unconditional respect as the autonomous sources 
of morality, and should be treated not as means but as ends in themselves. From this perspective, Hirsi 
Ali wages war against the oppression of Muslim women, and harmful practices such as female genital 
mutilation, sexual and domestic violence, forced marriages, and honour killing. Western liberals, 
especially feminists, should be consistent and publicly condemn these practices within immigrant 
communities rather than tolerate them for fear of further stigmatizing already marginalized people. 
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Such practices are to be treated as penal offences, liable to punishment no matter whether particular 
spokespersons (mostly men) defend them as essential to a community’s culture or religion. Hirsi Ali 
praises liberal democracy as a political regime which is undoubtedly superior to other regimes because 
it puts individual rights and freedoms first.  
 One of these rights is the right to lead one’s life in one’s own way, as guaranteed by 
freedom of conscience, freedom of opinion, freedom of association, etcetera. Hirsi Ali is a staunch 
defender of ethical autonomy, of the freedom to shape and pursue one’s own conception of the good 
and even to retract one’s fundamental convictions if one finds them no longer valid. Again she 
contrasts this with the world of Islam in which criticism, let alone renunciation of his faith by a born 
Muslim is simply inconceivable and punishable by death. She calls upon Western societies to actively 
support dissident Muslims like herself who face the wrath of their former fellow-believers. They 
should actively protect them, by providing them with de facto and not merely de jure exit options. 
Such exit options are also of the greatest importance for girls who are oppressed by a suffocating 
domestic environment or women who are trapped in an abusive relationship. In ‘Ten Tips for Muslim 
Women Who Want to Leave’, Hirsi Ali reminds Muslim women that freedom is not identical with 
being released from all bonds. Taking charge of your own life also requires being able to make well-
considered choices, to have a sense of purpose and a fair amount of discipline (Hirsi Ali 2006: 129-
140). Hence she subscribes to the view that ethical autonomy does not merely involve freedom from 
external pressures, but also implies that you are able to control your primary impulses, to focus on 
long-term life goals and to listen to your ‘better self’.  
In order to enable individuals to develop such a sense of a better self, Hirsi Ali urged the 
Dutch government not to stand back, but to encourage and stimulate people to become autonomous, 
especially through more active interventions in the education of second generation immigrants. As a 
member of parliament, she for instance took issue with the Dutch system of pillarization by 
consistently arguing for the abolition of Article 23 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of 
education by subsidizing denominational schools, whether Christian, Jewish, Muslim or otherwise. 
And she suggested that, in the case of illiterate and underprivileged parents, the state should take 
charge of the upbringing of their children. The rationale behind these proposals was not so much to 
mend socio-economic inequalities, but to cultivate a particular kind of personality, to civilize a 
culturally ‘backward’ minority. Her source of inspiration for this was the French system of public 
education, which teaches students that their loyalty lies first and foremost with the nation and the 
values of the secular, consitutional state, rather than with the articles of a religious creed. Education 
within a liberal state, according to this view, should provide young people with opportunities to 
broaden their horizon and acquaint them with a variety of life forms.12 In line with Joseph Raz’s 
comprehensive conception of liberalism, Hirsi Ali argued for public policies which actively supported 
institutions and life forms aimed at autonomy, while discouraging institutions and life forms which 
would produce dependency.  
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 3.2 Liberalism as a new faith 
Hence for Hirsi Ali, liberalism is clearly more than a political philosophy. It is also a comprehensive 
doctrine of the good which would be better for every human being to live by: ‘through comparative 
research I came to only one conlusion: Western democracy offers the best opportunities and chances 
for the development of a human being into a full-grown, sovereign individual’ (Fogteloo 2003: 18). 
Western culture brings forth ‘healthy, balanced and well-educated mothers’ and gives men ‘the 
opportunity to develop communication skills necessary for living harmoniously within a family’ (Hirsi 
Ali 2006: 2, 3). The Western world (‘the world of reason’) is ‘simply better’ (2007: 348). At one point, 
she even described her integration into Dutch society in religious terms; as an ‘initiation’ (inwijding) 
into modernity and claimed she had been ‘converted’ to democracy (Fogteloo 2003). And explaining 
why she left the social democrats to join the liberal party, she suggested that justice involved the 
stimulation of an individualistic life style rather than a focus on the rights of minority groups or 
communities: ‘I have come to realize that social justice begins with the freedom and integrity of the 
individual. Everything in our society focuses on the individual citizen: you take your exams on your 
own, you fill in your own tax form, and in court you have to face your sentence alone. Personal 
responsibility always comes first’ (2006: 68). She thereby conveniently ignored the fact that in the 
Netherlands, as in most other Western welfare states, solidarity with those who are less well-off is 
institutionalized, such that students who lag behind can get extra help in preparing their exams, poor 
people may ask advice in filling in their tax forms free of charge, and every citizen who has to appear 
in court is entitled to a public attorney.  
Most important, however, is that liberalism is viewed as the positive alternative for Islam. 
Thus, she presents her ‘fall’ from Islamic faith in terms of a conversion: ‘[…] but recently I was ready. 
The time had come. I saw that God was an invention’ (Hirsi Ali 2006: 76). When she finally dared to 
read the Atheist Manifesto by the Dutch philosopher Herman Philipse13, she soon ‘knew the answer. I 
had left God behind years ago. I was an atheist […] I felt relief. It felt right. There was no pain, but a 
real clarity’ (2007: 281). Similar to her espousal of liberalism, atheism is far more than a personal 
view. In her perception, a truly modern (wo)man can only be an atheist: ‘I think that most people who 
call themselves religious are essentially atheist […our (Dutch) prime minister] is forever referring to 
biblical standards and values […] yet he is an academic, a man who has learned to use well-reasoned 
arguments to find certain truths. Can he believe that the world was created in six days? […] That 
simply cannot be true. Scientists are unbelieving. I am convinced that our prime minister is not a 
Christian’ (Hirsi Ali 2006: 79-80).  
Hirsi Ali thus confesses her affinity with the radical Spinozist branch of Enlightenment: not 
only liberalism but atheism also acquires the status of a newly found faith. As in the above quotation, 
she frequently identifies Islam and Christianity with their most fundamentalist varieties. However, 
such equations do little justice to the complexity of the Enlightenment heritage. More moderate 
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Enlightenment thinkers like Voltaire, Locke, Kant, Mill, whom she presents as her heroes, actually 
preserved a faith in God. But theirs was no longer the faith as imposed by autorities such as the Holy 
Scripture, the clergy or the church. It was a faith they subscribed to on the basis of their own rational 
insights, a faith of their own personal making. The inauguration into modernity for many people in the 
West has not led to the abolition of religion, but to its displacement and transformation: a 
displacement from the public to the private sphere, a shift from believing on the authority of others to 
believing on one’s own authority, from the outside to the inside, as it were. A secular society is not the 
same as an atheist society. If so, atheism would become a new faith imposed from above. Hirsi Ali’s 
penchant for certainty in this respect is peculiarly at odds with the room for doubt liberalism has 
granted her and which she finds so sorely missing in Islam.14
 
3.3 Personal autonomy as the highest good  
While political liberals consider the comprehensive ideal of personal autonomy to be only one of 
many possible reasonable lifestyles from which free and equal citizens may choose, the radical liberal 
position represented by Hirsi Ali, inextricably intertwines ethical and personal autonomy. Hirsi Ali 
assumes that when people truly exercise their ethical autonomy, they will prefer an individualistic 
lifestyle in which personal autonomy is the most important good. But she is also convinced that 
personal autonomy is itself a necessary condition for making ethically autonomous choices. As people 
do not dispose of some innate capacity to choose the form of life which is best for them, such a 
capacity must be developed through particular modes of upbringing and education. How do these 
different conceptions of autonomy and liberalism work in concrete cases? Let me briefly present two 
cases where the relationship between the sexual autonomy of women and the principle of cultural 
diversity is at stake.  
 Imagine a well-educated Pakistani-American woman, let’s call her Naeema, who whole-
heartedly agrees that her parents select a husband for her, because she, as she tells us, has seen too 
many marriages ‘out of love’ end in divorce, and because she trusts her parents know what is best for 
her. Is such a compliance with the institution of arranged marriage proof of the ethical autonomy of 
this woman? A radical liberal like Hirsi Ali would not take Naeema’s word for it. She would for 
instance object that someone who agrees to her own arranged marriage does not realize that this 
practice itself is a denial of the autonomy of the partners involved. From a radical liberal perspective, a 
person’s actual behaviour tells us something about the extent to which she is really autonomous. By 
going along with the traditional customs of her community, Naeema leaves a vital decision such as the 
choice of a marriage partner to others, and as such she acts against her own best interests. In Hirsi 
Ali’s eyes, Naeema is seriously misled about her own good. Sadly, she does not realize that there is a 
fair chance that this arranged marriage will not contribute to her future happiness and well-being.   
A less comprehensive, more political view of liberalism, on the other hand, would invite a 
more tolerant approach. Starting from the assumption that Naeema is an adult individual who disposes 
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of the moral power to form, revise and rationally pursue her own conception of the good, we will be 
inclined to take her words seriously. Even if we cannot imagine making the same choice as Naeema, 
we would nevertheless respect it as a conscious and well-informed form of consent to a practice that is 
customary in the community she is brought up in. From the standpoint of political liberalism, we 
cannot take someone’s behaviour as an indication of her degree of autonomy. Moreover, we would 
feel that doubting Naeema’s capacity for autonomy would constitute a sign of disrespect and a denial 
of her status as a free and equal citizen. So long as her behaviour is not harmful to others, a liberal 
society should respect her choice to live in the way she thinks best.  
 
Another case revolves around the all-too-familiar issue of the Islamic headscarf or veil. Hirsi Ali has 
regularly indicated that Muslim women will only be truly liberated when they remove their veil, thus 
throwing off the backward views of female sexuality of which the veil is a symbol. However, many 
young Muslim women in the West claim to wear a headscarf out of their own free will: for religious 
reasons, because of the greater freedom of movement it gives them, or for identity-politocal reasons 
(‘proud to be Moroccan’). From a political liberal perspective such explanations suffice. Wearing a 
headscarf is after all quite a harmless custom, and in a liberal society citizens enjoy freedom of 
religion and are (within the bounds of decency) free to dress as they like. To such claims Hirsi Ali has 
always responded with a fair amount of scepsis. While emphasizing that Muslim women should be 
able to choose for themselves, she simultaneously has a clear idea about what that choice needs to be 
in order to count as really free. In her view, wearing a headscarf cannot possibly be part of a 
reasonably good life. The veil is imposed upon women in order to guarantee their chastity and to make 
them invisible for men who would otherwise not be able to control their sexual urges. Restrictions on 
clothing do not only curb the external but also the ‘inner freedom’ of women (2006: 22). Hence, to 
Hirsi Ali it is inconceivable, if not logically impossible, that free and reasonable people can 
simultaneously submit to the prescriptions of a religious creed.  
  
Accordingly, it appears that a political liberal perspective is better suited to accomodate a multicultural 
and multi-religious society than a more comprehensive perspective. A thin conception of liberalism is 
more generous to different forms of life and accepts that some citizens may thrive in an individualistic 
lifestyle, while others are happier when they can spend their life caring for others or in the service of 
some higher spiritual goal. Irrespective of whether conceptions of the good are more geared towards 
modern, traditional or “alternative” lifestyles, they are all equally permissible forms of a good life 
from a thin liberal perspective. Both libertine and illiberal lifestyles deserve respect. Whether 
individuals are led by a desire for non-conformity or for community, a liberal society will not interfere 
as long as they do not inflict harm upon eachother. Within this perspective, radical liberalism counts as 
one among many reasonable comprehensive doctrines. It is acknowledged that individualism does not 
automatically lead to a corrosion of character or an erosion of community. People who exclusively 
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focus on developing their skills and talents, who engage passionately in some form of art or in 
academic research, often make valuable contributions to society at large. But a purely individualistic 
life style is inconceivable, if not humanly impossible. There is no human flourishing without networks 
of close and distant relationships, without daily contacts with loved ones, neighbours, family, friends 
and/or colleagues. One may adhere to political liberalism as one’s political doctrine, one may 
personally pursue a quite individualistic career, and yet admit that there is a variety of other ways of 
living well, in which for instance care for the elderly, religious piety or commitment to one’s racial 
community occupy center stage. In other words, one may be aware, as Bhikhu Parekh has phrased it in 
his radical defense of a philosophy of multiculturalism, that ‘Every way of life, however good it may 
be, entails a loss [which] cannot be measured and compered’ (Parekh 2000: 48).  
 Radical liberals such Hirsi Ali seem to believe, on the other hand, that only their own 
conception of the good life brings universal happiness. They thereby ignore an essential part of the 
heritage of the Western Enlightenment which political liberals take far more seriously, which is the 
ability and will to relativize from time to time even one’s most cherished and fundamental truths and 
values.   
 
4. Sympathetic distrust 
However, do radical liberals not have a point when they refuse to take individuals’ own accounts of 
what is good for them at face value? How can we actually know when a life, even our own life, is 
really lived ‘from the inside’? Are not we sometimes mistaken about the true value that our faith or job 
really has for us? And are we then not grateful if someone helps us to see through our self-deception? 
In such cases, the adagium of toleration and respect for individual autonomy can become a license to 
indifference, based on an unreasonable fear of paternalism.  
 A persevering political liberal would claim that political liberalism prescribes a basic 
attitude of respect for the autonomy of one’s fellow citizens, unless there are clear signs that a person 
is deceiving herself. A radical liberal, on the other hand, would claim that instead of paying 
individuals unconditional respect at all times, it is sometimes better to adopt an attitude of sympathetic 
distrust. Her standpoint is motivated by the awareness that some practices or lifestyles perhaps are not 
harmful to others, but may be harmful to one self  – even if the person involved emphatically denies 
this. In such cases, sympathetic distrust is preferable to unconditional respect, although we of course 
need to enter into a contest over the right interpretation of the meaning and quality of the choices a 
person has made. And, as it always the risk with paternalistic interventions, it can be experienced as 
extremely offensive, even humiliating, when someone else pretends to know better what is good for 
you than you know it yourself.  
 
When do liberals have a reason to show sympathetic distrust? First, there are cases where individuals 
physically harm themselves. We call this self-mutilation, as in the case of teenage girls who cut 
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themselves in order to suppress their inner trials and tribulations. The term itself already indicates that 
in these cases people should be protected against themselves. We do not consider the person involved 
fully accountable for her deeds, because no person of sound mind would voluntarily choose to inflict 
pain upon herself. If we go along with this view, we may quite reasonably conclude that we do not 
need to respect the request of circumcised women for reinfibulation after child birth. It seems entirely 
justified, even if adult women ask for it themselves, to paternalistically prohibit performing such a 
form of genital mutilation (as is currently the case in the Netherlands). But if we follow this line of 
reasoning, it becomes quite hard to explain why we do not likewise outlaw forms of plastic surgery 
such as breast enlargement, constriction of the vagina, or excision of the inner labia – which are also 
performed at the request of women for ‘aesthetic’ reasons.15  
 The problem becomes thoroughly thorny when we judge that women who defend certain 
ideas or participate in certain practices are inflicting psychological or emotional harm on themselves. 
If, for instance, I do not agree with the opinion of an orthodox Christian that women are unsuitable for 
political and governmental functions, I can neither respect his wife in so far as she supports this view  
and hence thinks herself unfit for such jobs.16 The same goes for a woman who blames herself for her 
husband’s abusive behaviour, a girl who claims she should wear a headscarf because she would 
otherwise be a walking temptation to men, or a woman who agrees that women should not attend 
funerals because they are too emotional. From a perspective of sympathetic distrust, women do 
themselves wrong by cherishing such ideas. They degrade themselves, even if they deny doing this. 
Such internalizations of negative (sexist) self-images are harmful to a person because they affect her 
sense of dignity, her self-respect. And even from the ethically thin perspective of political liberalism, 
self-respect is a non-negotiable value.  
 Political liberals should therefore admit to radical liberals such as Hirsi Ali that the limits of 
toleration are located at this very spot.17 However, radical liberals are mistaken to perceive every 
choice of a more traditional way of life as a sign of insufficient ethical autonomy. It is not the case that 
all illiberal views inherently damage women’s self respect. When a woman for instances wishes to 
wear the veil on account of her religious belief, or to show that she is proud to be Moroccan, it is her 
way to win respect and to enhance her sense of dignity. An arranged (instead of a forced) marriage 
does not need to conflict with the ethical autonomy of the partners, nor does it necessarily violate their 
self-respect. Likewise it is perfectly conceivable that a person voluntarily parts with his possesions and 
gives up his freedom to enter a buddhist or catholic monastery, or that an engaged couple decides to 
preserve their virginity until their wedding night.  
 
5. The sexual autonomy of the prostitute      
The proposed reservation on the liberal value of toleration has serious repercussions for our thinking 
about how some traditional or religious practices affect the sexual autonomy of women, even if they 
willingly go along with them. It induces us to problematize customs such as reinfibulation, the cult of 
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(im)purity surrounding menstruation, or the exclusion of women from religious or governmental 
offices. But it also forces us to reconsider our views of practices such as pornography and prostitution, 
which we usually associate with modern, libertine conceptions of the good life. Surely there are 
women (and men) who enjoy their work as porn stars or prostitutes, who feel they are truly able to 
express themselves through it. However, there are sufficient reasons to adopt an attitude of 
sympathetic distrust, knowing that these practices often thrive upon a lack of self-respect of the 
women involved and on their inability to draw their own limits. In such cases, unconditional respect 
for autonomy becomes a euphemism for indifference.  
 In the feminist debate about prostitution, the issue of the sexual autonomy of prostitutes 
occupies center stage. In the Netherlands, the liberal arguments convinced politicians that legalization 
of prostitution would enhance the autonomy of prostitutes. Seven years later, all parties agree that it 
did not work out that way. In the following, I give a short overview oft he positions in the debate. I 
will argue that an attitude of sympathetic distrust may provide guidelines for a liberal approach of 
prostitution that does not shun paternalistic state intervention.  
 
5.1 Prostitution as sexual slavery  
Since the seventies, radical feminists have denounced prostitution as ‘one of the most graphic 
examples of men’s domination of women’ (Pateman 1983: 561). According to these critics, the sex 
industry is structured by deeply ingrained attitudes and values which are oppressive to women (Shrage 
1989). Prostitution consists of the exploitation of women by men: prostitutes are extremely vulnerable 
to violence and abuse, they have to submit to often perverse sexual wishes of customers who do not 
care about their well-being, and they are forced to hand over a large part of their earnings to their pimp 
or brothel keeper. For some radical feminists, prostitution is tantamount to sexual slavery. Their call 
for the prohibition of all forms of prostitution is sometimes referred to as ‘abolitionism’.  
Radical feminists claim that no woman engages in prostitution out of free will, since it is by 
definition impossible to make an autonomous choice for slavery. The good purchased from a prostitute 
is her own degradation; she is treated as a sexual object, a mere means to satisfy someone else’s needs. 
Prostitution is not like normal work, and the transaction between a prostitute and her client has nothing 
to do with a fair bargaining process (Anderson 2002). Admittedly, the Lockean notion of self-
ownership ‘allows for the commodification of a person's bodily capacity to labor’ (O’Connell 
Davidson 2002: 85). But Locke likewise considered the human body as God-given and sacred, which 
meant that people did not have the right to kill themselves or put themselves in slavery. O’Connell 
Davidson explains in more detail what the image of prostitution as slavery wishes to convey: ‘Sex or 
sexual labor is not exchanged in the prostitution contract. Rather, the client parts with money and/or 
other material benefits in order to secure powers over the prostitute's person that he (or more rarely 
she) could not otherwise exercise. He pays in order that he may direct the prostitute to make body 
orifices available to him, to smile, dance, or dress up for him, to whip, spank, urinate upon, massage, 
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or masturbate him, to submit to being urinated upon, shackled, or beaten by him, or otherwise act to 
meet his desires’ (O’ Connell Davidson 2002:85-86).  
Radical feminists also adduce empirical evidence to argue that very few women freely choose 
to prostitute themselves. Many prostitutes have a personal history of physical and sexual (child) abuse 
(Vanwesenbeeck 1994: 93), and the majority of women are forced to do the work, either phsyically or 
as a result of economic need (Hopkins 2005; Schaapman 2007). Even when initially entering the 
business on their own account, their freedom is relative: once ‘in’ it is difficult to get out again; most 
women indicate they rather did different work; and ‘as far as the work itself is concerned, it seems that 
a certain skill in splitting off feelings (“switching off” [de knop omdraaien, bp] is a precondition to 
keep on doing it […] One might even say that dissociative proficiency is a way of professionalism’ 
(Vanwesenbeeck 1994: 107).  
It is for these reasons that many radical feminists reject any argument which equates 
prostitution with other kinds of work in which bodily services are rendered. They also refuse to view 
prostitution as similar to sex without love or mutual affection: ‘the difference is that between the 
reciprocal expression of desire and unilateral subjection to sexual acts with the consolation of 
payment: it is the difference for women between freedom and subjection’ (Pateman 1983: 563). 
 
Radical feminists are particularly scornful about the suggestion that prostitution is a useful social 
institution because it prevents sexual frustration and even decreases incidences of rape, by providing 
men with an opportunity to satisfy their sexual needs in a regulated way. According to Dutch 
politician Karina Schaapman, ‘whore-hopping’ (hoerenlopen) is sometimes treated as a human (i.e. 
male) right, based on the assumption that sexual desire is as basic as the need for food. But this is a 
ridiculous assumption: we do not need sex in order to survive. In a recent pamphlet in which she 
denounces the ‘normalization’ of prostitution, Schaapman quotes the Dutch feminist and first female 
doctor Aletta Jacobs, who at the beginning of the 20th century responded to a gentleman who claimed 
that prostitution was, alas, a ‘necessary evil’: ‘If that is really your opinion, it is your ethical duty to 
make your daughter available to serve that aim’ (Schaapman 2007a: 6).18 Schaapman, who is a social-
democratic member of the municipal council of Amsterdam provides a graphical description of what it 
takes, especially for a young girl, to satisfy the sexual need of her clients: ‘she irrevocably has to deal 
with aggression, jealousy, drugs, sickness, rock-hard penetrations and perverse sexual demands. This 
requires at least a full-grown body, expertise and a strong personality. How many eighteen-year-old 
prostitutes meet these requirements?’(15).19  
Radical feminists also argue, finally, that commercial sex is not only damaging to women who 
sell sex but is harmful to all women. It reinforces the idea that women are or should be sexually 
available. And in confirming the distinction between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ women, it leaves women in our 
society no other option than to identify with either the image of the whore, who is considered immoral 
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because sexually loose, or the madonna, who is put on a pedestal because of her chastity while 
simultaneously being divested of her sexual freedom.   
 
5.2 Prostitution as sex work 
Liberal feminists are often no less concerned about the miserable condition of the majority of women 
who work in the sex industry. But they are convinced that the abolition of prostitution will not 
improve that situation. When prostitution becomes illegal, their situation would only become worse. 
The strategy should be exactly the reverse: in order to protect their rights, improve their working 
conditions and further the sexual autonomy of prostitutes, voluntary prostitution should be recognized 
as work, as a profession like any other. Prostitutes are not to be regarded as victims of sexual violence 
and oppression - this only contributes to their stigmatization. Rather, they should be conceived as ‘sex 
workers’ who are entitled to the same social and economic rights as other workers. The women’s 
movement should support prostitutes in their struggle for emancipation and empowerment rather than 
go along with the conservative politics of ‘divide and conquer’, i.e. distinguish between good and bad 
women in order to rule over the sexuality of all women. Human rights should be extended towards the 
rights of prostitutes as a sexual minority. Prostitutes are ‘to decide for themselves what they do with 
their body, hence also to sell sex without being socially ostracized as “bad” women’ (quoted in De 
Vries and Zuidema 2006: 43).20
 
A particularly outspoken plea for the normalization of prostitution is offered by Martha Nussbaum 
(Nussbaum 1999). Her main point is that, as long as women freely engage in it, there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with sex work. She admits that prostitutes actually suffer much harm, and that 
most women feel forced to do the work because they lack other employment opportunities. But 
objections by radical feminists that prostitution essentially involves submitting your body to the 
control of others, or that it is about the invasion of intimate bodily space, are rejected on account that 
most labour activities are controlled by others, and that there is nothing wrong with having your body 
invaded so long as it happens with your consent. In order to support these claims, Nussbaum discusses 
a series of other work activities where bodily services are also rendered, and which we do not find 
problematic. The list for instance includes the job of a professor in philosophy, who also takes money 
for work in ‘an area of intimate self-expression’, namely ‘thinking and writing about what she thinks’, 
and whose ‘intimate bodily space’ is likewise invaded, i.e. by arguments entering her mind (1999: 
283, 284). An even more far-fetched comparison involves the job of the ‘colonoscopy artist’: a 
hypothetical occupation invented by Nussbaum in order to argue that a job in which a woman would 
take money for having medical students penetrate her colon for the purpose of research and training, 
however odd or risky, would not be regarded as immoral. According to Nussbaum, the only reason 
why we think the invasion of bodily space in prostitution intrinsically wrong, is that it involves sexual 
activity. While radical feminists consider prostitution to be a graphic example of male domination of 
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women, the liberal feminist standpoint, as voiced by Nussbaum, attributes the stigma of prostitution to 
the male wish to control women. For Nussbaum, the prostitute is ‘a sexually active women’ who 
undermines the existing gender hierarchy, and who subverts conservative ideas about female sexuality. 
The radical feminist explanation of the stigma is insufficient, because ‘it is only a small minority of 
people’ (i.e. radical feminist themselves…) who perceive prostitution as illustrative of male 
supremacy.21   
 
5.3 Prostitution as a profession 
During the 1980s, the liberal feminist view of female sexuality, pornography and prostitution 
gradually got the upper hand in the Netherlands. A true feminist was a woman who dared to engage in  
sexual experiments, and hookers and pornstars were seen as the new vanguard in this struggle for 
sexual liberation. Critical theorists remarked that in a short period of time, discussions in the women’s 
movement had made a U-turn from critical assessments of the relation between female sexuality and 
gender hierarchy to a libertine approach which rejected any normative approach of sexuality. They 
warned that this only meant that new norms had gained the upperhand, while it simultanously had 
become impossible to challenge these norms without being accused of moralism (Tonkens and 
Volman 1988). Such warnings were to no avail. The majority of politicians and policy-makers became 
convinced that the only way to improve the position of prostitutes was legalization: not only would it 
remove the stigma attached to their work, it would also enable the authorities to tackle problems of 
public safety historically linked with prostitution such as criminality, violence, trafficking in women, 
and drugs. The formulation of the new law testified to the intention to support and protect the rights 
and autonomy of prostitutes. It recognized prostitution as a profession, albeit an exceptional one in 
which the worker may insist on her right to bodily integrity. The distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary prostitution is therefore essential: any form of force, violence or deceit is punishable by 
law, and a prostitute should be able ‘under circumstances’ to refuse the agreed-upon labour (De Vries 
and Zuidema 2006: 45). Simultaneously it is important to note that the preceding legislation on public 
decency (in effect since 1911) did not prohibit prostitution as such (which been legalized since 1811) 
but the ‘soliciting of fornication’ (gelegenheid geven tot ontucht). In that period, the ban on brothels 
was supported by feminists like Aletta Jacobs in order to protect prostitutes from exploitation.22 The 
2000 legislation lifted the ban on brothels for the same purpose: to lay down strict rules and 
regulations for running a legal sex business, so that prostitutes could work in a safe and hygienic 
environment.     
 
Six years later, the parties involved are beginning to take stock. Everybody agrees that legalization has 
not (yet) had the hoped-for effects. Currently, between 15.000 and 20.000 prostitutes are estimated to 
be active in the Netherlands. More than half of them originate from foreign countries. Trafficking in 
women and illegal prostitution seem to have increased rather than decreased. In the red lights districts 
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of major cities, illegal women from abroad are kept by pimps who often abuse them. They do not have 
the courage to go to the police for fear of retaliation. And if they do report their assailants, the Dutch 
judicial system treats them primarily as illegal migrants rather than victims of sexual abuse. Instead of 
being offered assistance and counseling, they are deported from the country as soon as they have 
played their part as witness for the prosecution. Furthermore, the stigma on prostitutes, whether 
voluntary or not, has not disappeared. Only 5% of active prostitutes have officially registered at the tax 
department as self-employed workers. Since 2000, about half of the prostitutes left the legal sector in 
order to work in informal and illegal branches of the sex industry, while technological developments 
made it easier to go underground. Legal exploiters have difficulty competing with this illegal circuit. 
Everyone with a mobile phone and an advertisement in a news paper can start an escort-service or a 
webcam site. These new forms of prostitution are difficult to control. They evade municipal 
boundaries, and the sex work often takes place in the privacy of a house or a hotel room.  
Finally, almost all prostitutes complain about the hardening of the industry. The emergence of 
websites with extreme porn induces customers to make ever more extreme demands. The average 
client is interested in cheap, superficial and anonymous sex, and prefers young, unexperienced and 
obedient women. Schaapman offers quotes from a popular site (www.hookers.nl) where customers 
rate prostitutes for the quality of their sex services. They show precious little compassion. When a girl 
complains about pain or behaves passively, she gets a negative review. When she is obviously forced, 
her customer simply does not care.23           
 
The conclusion of Dutch critics of prostitution is that legalization will not help to improve the position 
of prostitutes. While she does not propose to outlaw brothels, Karina Schaapman argues that as a 
society we should finally recognize that ‘whore-hopping is not normal’ and that prostitution will never 
be a profession in which a person can find true fulfillment. Dutch government should actively 
discourage boys and men, the (potential) customers, through educating them about minimal standards 
for proper human interaction, and by raising their awareness that ‘certain sexual wishes are not 
“normal”, and that fantasies and desires need not always be realized. Customers should realize the 
effects of their demand for sex’, namely that ‘the satisfaction of the need of one person immediately 
violates the dignity of an other’ (Schaapman 2007: 51; 46).      
 
While admitting to the failure of the legalization of prostitution so far, liberal feminists however 
conclude that rights and regulations remain the best protection against violence and abuse in the sex 
industry. The abnormalization of customers only adds to the further stigmatization of whores, while 
criminalization would deprive them of their public voice. Policy measures should therefore be geared 
to increasing the autonomy of prostitutes by informing them about their rights and by stimulating them 
to start their own business. Meanwhile, whore-hoppers should become ‘critical customers’ who visit 
only bona fide brothels (Weijers 2007). One of them sketches her ideal of the sovereign prostitute as 
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follows: ‘Sex workers who feel confident about their work stand up for their rights, no longer accept 
exploitation and violence, work independently, determine their own price, refuse ennoying customers, 
give pimps the sack, expose abuses and in that way will change the sex industry from within’ (Van 
Doorninck 2006: 17).  
However, Dutch liberals are divided on this issue: while representatives of the left-wing 
GreenLeft party like Van Doorninck insist on the empowerment of prostitutes as strong women who 
celebrate their sexual autonomy, a recent comment by representatives of the conservative-liberal party 
(VVD) is less optimistic. Although the authors claim that the state should remain morally neutral and 
disagree with Schaapman’s proposal that government should spread the message that visiting 
prostitutes is abnormal, they otherwise fully subscribe to her radical critique: in prostitution the line 
between voluntary and forced sex work is ‘paper-thin’, as is the line between protection and 
exploitation by pimps, or between a decent and an abusive customer (Bierens and Richert 2007). They 
therefore advocate a reconsideration of the ban on pimping (souteneurschap), and advise that boys 
should be taught that, even though the state does not condemn commercial sex as such, it denies them 
the right ‘to give full rein to one’s perverse personal desires’. In their interpretation, liberalism 
considers individual freedom to be the supreme good, as long as it does not violate the freedom of 
others. This requires that people should behave responsibly and respect the freedom of others. 
Liberalism must not be confused with a ‘libertine culture’ which identifies freedom with lawlessness. 
Citing John Locke (“Where there is no law, there is no freedom”), they point out that the ban on the 
prohibition of brothels should have been accompanied by general procedures in order to regulate the 
conditions of labour contracts between prostitutes and brothel keepers. These practicalities are now 
left to the better judgement of local authorities and to negotiations between employers and employees. 
Thus, the Dutch government hides behind the liberal rationale that the state should remain neutral in 
matters of private law. The effect is that prostitutes are left to their own devices when they want to 
enforce the rights to protection they are entitled to (De Vries and Zuidema 2006: 46). 
 
6. Conclusion: cultural diversity and the good of sexuality 
In this paper, I have focused on two debates which address the position of categories of women that are 
usually perceived as entirely different. While Muslim women supposedly subordinate to the most 
restrictive rules of sexual chastity, the prostitute embodies the libertine image of the loose woman 
unbound by any sexual restriction. Yet, what these debates have in common is that they both revolve 
around the sexual autonomy of women. The position of Muslim women is an important topic in debates 
on multiculturalism, where liberals try to find a balance between the values of cultural diversity and the 
sexual autonomy of women. In these discussions, there is considerable agreement with a liberal feminist 
such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali, that the collective right of a minority community to preserve its culture or 
religion should give way in cases where the fundamental rights or the autonomy of its members (in most 
cases women) are violated. Difficulties arise, however, in deciding what views and practices count as 
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violations of autonomy. A comparison with debates on prostitution in Western societies proves to be 
enlightening. Radical and liberal feminists agree that women’s rights to sexual autonomy are 
indisputable. But they vehemently disagree about the question what practices enable women to exercise 
their sexual autonomy: does arranged marriage? Or prostitution? While in multiculturalism the problem 
is phrased in terms of the tension between the liberal values of sexual autonomy and cultural diversity, 
debates about prostitution link the problematics of female sexual autonomy to disputes over (morally and 
ethically) permissable conceptions of the good life.  
 Evidently, both are sensitive issues among Western feminists. The reason, I suggest, is that they 
touch upon a question which seems almost improper to ask from the political perspective of liberalism: 
the question about the good of sexuality itself.    
 
There is no disagreement about the most graphic examples of injustice suffered by Muslim women or 
prostitutes: forced marriage is as harmful as forced prostitution, abuse by a husband is equally wrong as 
abuse by a pimp, rape in marriage is just as reprehensible as raping a prostitute, and the modern practice 
of  cutting the labia of American teenagers (I dare to add) is a form of physical mutilation whuch recalls 
the traditional custom of genital circumcision of little Somali girls. Difficulties arise, however, when 
adult women appear to choose freely or go along with sexual views or practices which others reasonably  
assume degrading, harmful or restrictive - such as wearing a chador, consenting to an arranged marriage, 
asking for reinfibulation, working as a prostitute or participating in pornographic movies. In these cases, 
it is granted that women should be able to engage in sexual activities when, where and with whom they 
wish. But it is questioned whether women’s consent to these practices are authentic or in their own best 
interest. Yet, ethical autonomy is not merely about women’s first- and second-order desires. It is also 
about the freedom to follow their desire given their conception of the good life - which includes, I would 
claim, their conception of the good of sexuality. The reasons for sympathetic distrust derive from the fact 
that we disagree with the conception of the good of sexuality these practices embody. However, we shy 
away from voicing our disagreement because this would imply that we would have to publicly articulate 
our own ideas about the good of sexuality. This would mean that we violate the liberal understanding 
that it is inappropriate to politicize matters of personal ethics, in so far as they fall within the boundaries 
of what is considered reasonable. In this sense, the adagium of the priority of the right over the good 
functions as a taboo with politically and morally detrimental effects.  
 
The good of sexuality from a liberal perspective, if I may venture a tentative description, is a good that 
we should enjoy exclusively for its intrinsic value. Sexuality is to be appreciated as the locus of intimacy, 
authenticity and joy, irrespective whether it is experienced solo or with a (or more) partner(s), whether it 
is part of a monogamous love relationship or of a promiscuous life, or whether it involves  partners of the 
opposite or the same sex. The good of sexuality thus understood encapsulates a wide variety of acts and 
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practices which are dependent on individual sexual desires and phantasies. The only condition for 
enacting one’s desires is that the other person also derives pleasure from it.  
 On this account, any setting in which sexuality is exchanged for or enacted exclusively to further 
another good than (mutual) pleasure violates the good of sexuality. This view enables us to articulate our 
sympathetic distrust vis-à-vis conservative settings in which sexuality is primarily perceived as a means 
for reproduction or as a site of social honour. But it likewise enables us to question libertine views which 
perceive sexuality as the unilateral satisfaction of bodily appetites or the mere penetration of one body by 
another. Sexuality, on this conception, is a good that exceeds the logic of the rational contract which 
underlies liberal theories of justice. The meaning of the good of sexuality should neither be left to 
religious, medical or other authorities, nor to the mechanisms of the free market. Sexuality should be 
regarded as analogous to play rather than to work. If it involves submission and giving up control, it 
involves surrendering primarily to your own lust and desire, not to that of others. In this conception, it is 
not the value of sexual autonomy that decides which practices of sexuality are permissible, but the other 
way around: what counts as sexual autonomy is determined by this conception of sexuality as an intrinsic 
good.    
 
The obvious objection to this is of course, that it merely reflects our Western modernist view of 
sexuality. It is claimed that these are constructions of sexuality as the locus of authenticity, spontaneity 
and self-expression which could just as well have been otherwise. Indeed, they have been otherwise in 
other historical eras, and they are still otherwise in non-Western cultures. Accordingly, they merely 
represent the prejudiced ideas of an individualistic Western culture, which is rooted in the heritage of 
Christian and Romantic notions of the body and the self. Martha Nussbaum’s assessment of prostitution 
represents a paradigmatic example of such criticism. It is remarkable how Nussbaum’s relativistic 
references to the constructed nature of modern experiences of the self and sexuality presuppose a view of 
what sexuality ‘essentially’, i.e. stripped of its cultural, social and psychological meanings, amounts to: 
making use of your body. But of course such a rationalistic account which is fully reminiscent of 
Marquis de Sade’s Philosophie dans le Boudoir, is no less embedded in a particular cultural and social 
context. It too comprises a particular (and thus essentially contested) moral and ethical view of human 
sexuality. Notably, Nussbaum does not use her relativization of the meaning of sexuality to belittle the 
problematic situation of the majority of women engaged in prostitution. She emphasizes that the most 
urgent task is to widen the range of employment options for poor women, so that they do not feel forced 
to make a living through prostitution. But underlying, the message is that there is a possible world in 
which ‘taking money for the use of one’s body’ (Nussbaum 1999: 297) might be conceived and 
experienced as a way of functioning that does not affect human dignity in any way.  
 Although he likewise suggests that the possibility of a world in which having sex is comparable 
to just having dinner, is ‘a consummation devoutly to be wished’, Scott Anderson (2002: 774) argues 
against Nussbaum that we have to accept that sexuality in our societies happens to be a ‘prominent 
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aspect of our conception of self’. But shrewdly evading the normative question whether this is a good or 
a bad thing, Anderson criticizes prostitution as an inherently injust institution because ‘it helps 
institutionalize unequal access to sex having such special status, as well as unequal sexual autonomy’ 
(775).  
 
Martha Nussbaum takes issue with the way in which radical feminists ‘view the prostitute as they view 
veiled women, or women in purdah: with sympathetic anger, as victims of an unjust system’ 
(Nussbaum 1999: 286). In this paper, I have subscribed to the claim that liberalism as a political 
theory should cherish the values of individual autonomy and a plurality of conceptions of the good 
life, and should resist the temptation to reduce liberalism to one particular conception of the good life. 
But I hope that I have offered convincing arguments why, where the sexual autonomy of women is 
concerned we must exercise sympathetic distrust with regard to some practices and activities 
(conservative or libertine) with which women willingly go along, although we have good reason that 
these practices are harmful to them. In recent debates it is frequently claimed that liberals have 
allowed themselves to be taken hostage by the ideology of multiculturalism, and have adopted an 
overly tolerant attitude towards mysogynous practices in illiberal communities under the pretext that it 
is ‘their own culture’. I think we should also be aware of not being taken hostage by libertarian and 
libertine views which prevent us from facing the exploitation and humiliation of women in the sex 
industry the under the pretext that it is ‘their own choice’.      
 25
Literature 
Amara, Fadela (2004) Geen sletten, geen slavinnen. Meisjes uit de voorsteden. Amsterdam: Mets en 
Schilt (translation of Ni putes, ni soumises, Paris 2003). 
Anderson, Scott A. (2002) Prostitution and Sexual Autonomy: Making Sense of the Prohibition of 
Prostitution. Ethics 112, pp. 748-780.  
Appiah, Anthony Kwame (2005) The ethics of identity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Bellil, Samira (2003) Ontsnapt uit de hel. Een vrouw strijdt tegen seksueel geweld. Amsterdam: Arena 
(translation of Dans l’enfer des tournantes, Paris 2002).  
Berlin, Isaiah (1969) [1958]) Two Concepts of Liberty. In: I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 118-172. 
Bierens, Sabine, and C. Richert (2007) Vrijheid is de afwezigheid van externe dwang. Pleidooi voor 
een waar liberaal prostitutiebeleid. Waterstof  nr. 23 (retrieved from www.waterlandstichting.nl 
April 18, 2007). 
Braidotti, Rosi, (1994), Nomadic Subjects. Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary 
Feminist Theory. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Christman, John & J. Anderson (Eds)(2005). Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Djavann, Chahdortt (2004) Weg met de sluier! Amsterdam: Contact (translation of Bas les voiles! Paris 
2003). 
Doorninck, Marieke van (2006) Emancipatie. Tijdschrift van de liga voor de rechten van de mens 25 
(76), pp.16-17).  
Dworkin, Gerald (1988), The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Eriksson, Marianne (2003) Draft report on the consequences of the sex industry in the European Union 
(retrieved from www.vguengl.org/medialibrary/files/sexindustryEN.pdf) 
Fogteloo, Margreet (2003). “Als je een grote droom hebt, zet je door”. Interview with Ayaan Hirsi Ali. De 
Groene Amsterdammer, March 1. 
Forst, Rainer (2005) Political Liberty: Integrating Five Conceptions of Autonomy. In: Christman & 
Anderson 2005, pp. 226-242. 
Harding, Sandra, (1993a), Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: ‘What Is Strong Objectivity’? In: L. 
Alcoff and E. Potter (Eds) Feminist Epistemologies. New York: Routledge,  pp.49-82. 
Hirsi Ali, Ayaan (2001) Laat ons niet in de steek. Gun ons een Voltaire. Trouw, November 24. 
Hirsi Ali, Ayaan (2002) De zoontjesfabriek. Over vrouwen, islam en integratie. 
Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Augustus. 
Hirsi Ali, Ayaan (2004) De maagdenkooi. Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Augustus 
Hirsi Ali, Ayaan (2006) The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam. 
New York: Free Press. 
 26
Hirsi Ali, Ayaan (2007) Infidel. New York: Free Press.  
Hirsi Ali, Ayaan and Geert Wilders (2003) Het is tijd voor een liberale jihad. NRC Handelsblad, April 12.  
Hopkins, Ruth (2005). Ik laat je nooit meer gaan. Het meisje, de vrouw, de handelaar en de agent. 
Breda: De Geus.  
Jacobs, Aletta H. (1899) Wettelijke regeling der prostitutie. In: A.H. Jacobs, Vrouwenbelangen. Drie 
vraagstukken van actueelen aard. Amsterdam: L.J. Veen, pp.30-62.  
Jong, Sjoerd de (2003) De vrienden van Ayaan. NRC Handelsblad, January 28. 
Kalsky, Manuela (2003) Hirsi Ali heeft een achterlijk beeld van religie. Trouw, January 29.   
Kelek, Necla (2005) Die fremde Braut. Ein Bericht aus dem Inneren des türkischen Leben in 
Deutschland. Köln: Kiepenhuier und Witsch Verlag. 
Kymlicka, Will (2002, second ed.) Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Introduction. Oxford: Oxfrod 
University Press. 
Levy, Ariel (2005). Female Chauvinist Pigs. Women and the Rise of Raunch Culture. New York: Free 
Press.  
Linde, Mark van den (2003) Verlichtingsfundamentalisme. Het Parool, February 6.   
Mill, John Stuart (1972 [1859]). On liberty. London: Dent & Sons. 
Nussbaum, Martha (1999) “Whether from Reason or Prejudice”: Taking Money for Bodily Services. In: 
M.C. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 276-298.  
O'Connell Davidson, Julia (2002) The rights and wrongs of prostitution. Hypatia 17 (2), pp. 84-98. 
Okin, Susan Moller (1998) Feminism and multiculturalism: Some tensions. Ethics 108. Pp. 661-684.  
Okin, Susan Moller (1999) Is multiculturalism bad for women? Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Parekh, Bhikhu (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press. 
Pateman, Carol (1983). Defending Prostitution: Charges against Erisson. Ethics 93, pp. 561-565.  
Prins, Baukje (2001) Heilig, Trouw, November 17.  
Prins, Baukje (2004) Voorbij de onschuld. Het debat over integratie in Nederland. Amsterdam: Van 
Gennep (2nd rev.edition).  
Prins, Baukje (2005) Emancipatie: tussen autonomie en paternalisme. In: B. Snels (Ed), Vrijheid als 
ideaal. Amsterdam: SUN, pp. 107-124. 
Prins, Baukje (2006) Mothers and Muslima’s, Sisters and Sojourners: the Contested Boundaries of 
Feminist Citizenship. In: K. Davis, M. Evans & J. Lorber (Eds). Handbook for Women´s 
Studies. SAGE  pp.234-250. 
Raymond, Janice G (2003) 10 Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution. Coalition Against Trafficking 
in Women International (CATW) (retrieved from 
www.action.web.ca/home/catw/readingroom.sthml, also published in Melissa Farley (Ed.) 
(2003) Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress. Binghamton: Haworth Press) 
Rawls, John (1993) Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.  
 27
Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 
Saharso, Sawitri (2000) Feminisme versus multiculturalisme? Utrecht: Forum. 
Scott, Joan Wallach, (1996), Only Paradoxes to Offer. French Feminists and the Rights of Man. 
Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Schaapman, Karina (2007a). Hoerenlopen is niet normaal. Twijfels bij een liberaal prostitutiebeleid.  
Amsterdam: Balans. 
Schaapman, Karina (2007b). Motherless. London: John Murray (translation of Zonder moeder. 
Amsterdam: Balans 2004) 
Sennett, Richard (2003). Respect in a world of inequality.New York: Norton & Company. 
Shrage, Laurie (1989) Should Feminists Oppose Prostitution? Ethics 99, pp. 347-361. 
Taylor, Charles (1979). What’s wrong with negative liberty? In: A. Ryan (Ed), The Idea of Freedom. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 175-193.  
Taylor, Charles (1992). The Politics of Recognition. In : A. Gutman (Ed), Multiculturalism and the 
‘Politics of Recognition’. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 25-73. 
Tonkens, Evelien & M. Volman (1988) ...En lust voor ons allen ! Het einde van de sekualiteitsdiskussie in 
de vrouwenbeweging? Tijdschrift voor Vrouwenstudies 9 (1), pp. 58-74.  
Vanwesenbeeck, Ine (1994) Prostitutes’ well-being and risk. Amsterdam:  VU University Press.  
Vink, Jaffe (2002) Kom op, socialisten, debatteer! Trouw, March 23.   
Vries, Petra de, and R. Zuidema (2006) Wat mag het lichaam voor geld? Feminisme, sekswerk en de 
opheffing van het bordeelverbod in historisch perspectief. Tijdschrift voor Genderstudies 9 (2), 
pp.37-49. 
Waldron, Jeremy (2005). Moral Autonomy and Personal Auttonomy. In: Christman & Anderson 2005, 
pp. 307-329.   
Weijers, Marjan (2007) Co-referaat bij Aletta Jacobslezing ‘Hoerenlopen is niet normaal’. Presented in 
Groningen, March 7.  
Wikan, Unni (2002) Generous betrayal. Politics of culture in the new Europe. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 





                                                 
1 I would like to thank Dick Pels for his exquisite corrections of my English.  
2 See for instance: Wikan 2002, Bellil 2003, Djavan 2004, Amara 2004, Manji 2004, Kelek 2005. 
3 For Dutch book publications, see: Hirsi Ali 2002; 2004.  
4 For English publications, see: Hirsi Ali 2006; 2007. Her work has meanwhile been translated in many 
languages.  
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5 Some radical feminist voices on pornography and prostitution were Kate Millett, Susan Griffin, Andrea 
Dworkin and Catherine McKinnon. Some of their most renowned liberal feminist opponents were Gayle Rubin, 
Carol Vance, Pat Califia and Gail Pheterson. 
6 The dominant usage is to refer to this form of autonomy as personal autonomy. See for instance Joseph Raz 
who defines personal autonomy as ‘the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, 
fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives’ (1986: 369), Kwame Anthony Appiah for 
whom personal autonomy is ‘to actively choose the values and projects you wish to pursue’ (2005: 38) or Jeremy 
Waldron’s image of ‘a person in charge of his life […] choosing which of his desires to follow’ (2005: 307). 
Gerald Dworkin’s definition of autonomy as ‘the capacity of persons critically to reflect upon, and then attempt 
to accept or change, his or her preferences, values and ideals’ (Dworkin 1988: 48), seems to cover the same 
ground, but the lexical priority is reversed: this definition is meant to capture the meaning of the overall concept 
of autonomy, of which moral autonomy is a particular case.  I prefer to go along with Rainer Forst’s coinage of 
ethical autonomy (see Forst 2005), because this form of autonomy is reminiscent of the Greek notion of ethics as 
the relation of the self to itself, and because I preserve the notion of personal autonomy for a third (more 
substantive) form of autonomy to be explained later on in the paper. 
7 In the familiar terminology of Berlin: our positive liberty depends on the amount of negative liberty a society 
provides to its citizens (Berlin 1969). It was Charles Taylor who distinguished these two forms of liberty by 
typifying negative liberty as an opportunity concept and positive liberty as an exercise concept. Where it must be 
noted that Taylor embraces a more communitarian perspective on the self, according to which the exercise of 
(ethical) autonomy is enabled first and foremost by the sources of a society’s culture and its shared conception of 
the good (see Taylor 1979; 1992).  
8 Compare Sandra Harding's observation of the ‘contradictory nature’ of the feminist project, as ‘forced to “speak 
as” and on behalf of the very notion it criticizes and tries to dismantle – women’ (Harding 1993: 59). Or Rosi 
Braidotti’s observation that ‘[f]eminism is based on the very notion of female identity, which it is historically bound 
to criticize. Feminist thought rests on a concept that calls for deconstruction and de-essentialization in all of its 
aspects’ (Braidotti 1994: 157). 
9 As I claimed elsewhere, feminist philosophers like Nancy Fraser, Seyla Benhabib and Chantal Mouffe believe 
that liberal-democratic society offers the best prospects for such a transformative approach (Prins 2005).  
10 Since spring 2001, Hirsi Ali was affiliated to the Wiardi Beckman foundation, the department of scientific 
research of the PvdA (the Dutch social-democratic party).  
11 My first meeting with Hirsi Ali and her subsequent conquest of the hearts and minds of many Dutch, including 
some of Holland’s most outstanding intellectuals and feminists, incited me to make a serious effort at answering 
the question which in the afore mentioned article I had merely raised (see for instance Prins 2004; 2005). The 
current paper can be considered as a further elaboration of my response to feminist critics of multiculturalism 
such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali.        
12 According to Mill, individuality was one of the essential ingredients of human well-being. In order to develop 
individuality, people needed to be free to explore a variety of different life situations (Mill 1972: 116). 
13 This Atheïstisch Manifest was first published in 1995. In 2004, a second and updated edition appeared, 
accompanied by a preface by Hirsi Ali.   
14 Several Dutch commentators have pointed out an internal contradiction in Hirsi Ali´s views on Enlightenment 
and religion. According to one of them, Hirsi Ali expressed her ‘passionate love for secular society in precisely 
the terms [of unconditional ties and an imperative monoculture, bp] which are alien to it’ (De Jong 2003). 
Another described Hirsi Ali and her adherents as ‘atheist Enlightenment fundamentalists’, who, craving for 
certainty, started a true ‘jihad against maladjustment´ (Van den Linde (2003)). After reading Hirsi Ali’s first 
book De zoontjesfabriek, feminist historian Jolanda Withuis concluded: ‘Hirsi Ali writes with the understandable 
anger of someone who just escaped from a religious sect, and with the enthusiasm, but also the absolute certainty 
[rechtlijnigheid, which could also be translated with straightforwardness, but has a more pejorative connotation] 
of the fresh convert’ (Withuis 2002). And according to theologian Manuela Kalsky, just like the conservative 
Muslims she challenges, Hirsi Ali takes religion to be a matter of fundamental religious conviction rather than a 
matter of textual interpretation of Bible or Koran (Kalsky 2003). 
15 A documentary by Dutch film maker Sunny Bergman, Beperkt houdbaar [Perishable], broadcast on national 
television on May 8 2007, sketches a disconcerting picture of Western women who are willing to undergo (and 
pay huge amounts of money for) plastic surgery in order to get the so-called ‘Playboy look’ - the new ideal of 
female beauty, set by the photoshopped images of porn-stars, who themselves already are the products of 
elaborate plastic surgery. The film elicited much discussion in the Netherlands about the emergence of a ‘bimbo 
culture’, a discussion which is currently propelled forth further by extensive media attention for the Dutch 
translation of Ariel Levy’s book Female Chauvinist Pigs (Levy 2005).  
16 This is a reference to the ideas of an actual existing Dutch political party, the Staatkundig Gereformeerde 
Partij (SGP), which has two seats in parliament.  
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17 One could of course also argue that conceptions of the good which are harmful to self should no less count as 
reasonable and permissible as do conceptions which are harmful to others. 
18 ‘Indien dat werkelijk uwe meening is, zijt ge zeedelijk verplicht uw dochter voor dit doel beschikbaar te 
stellen’ (cited in Schaapman 2007: 6). 
19 As a young woman, Schaapman worked as a prostitute in the Amsterdam Red Lights District herself. In her 
autobiography, she explains how she got into it more or less by chance, although the death of her mother when 
she was thirteen and her flight from an abusive father obviously played a role (Schaapman 2007b).     
20 As part of the attempt to normalize prostitution, on March 31 2007 several brothels, sex theaters and window 
prostitutes in the Red Lights District in Amsterdam opened their doors for the wider public. The liberal feminist 
solidarity with prostitutes was nicely illustrated that day by the unveiling of statue, initiated by the Prostitution 
Information Center, representing the prostitute as a strong and proud woman (called ‘Belle’). The statue is 
dedicated to prostitutes all over the world. 
21 I cannot help noticing that the fact that it is only a minority of people who hold a certain view seems quite an 
awkward reason for rejecting that view, especially because the standpoint which Nussbaum herself elaborates in 
this article against what she deems an ‘irrational’ view of sexuality, will be subscribed to by an even smaller 
minority of rationalistic libertines.  
22 Aletta Jacobs’s argument against the state regulation of prostitution and in favour of the prohibition of 
brothels, shows remarkable similarities to Karina Schaapman’s essay more than a century later (see Jacobs 
1899).   
23 This information is gathered from Raymond 2003, Hopkins 2005, Schaapman 2007. 
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